This paper is a case study on public technology procurement. It deals with the procurement of the Austrian computerized digital switching system (OES) by the Austrian telecom provider. As a method, the conceptual approach of National Innovation Systems has been adopted. The study includes a description of the key organizations of the procurement process and their relationships, of its management, its costs as well as ist societal and industrial benefits, and, finally, of its historical and institutional background. It turned out, that the procurement process of OES was not part of a long-term technology policy on behalf of the government. Austria succeeded in building up technological know-how on digital telecom systems but did not go beyond the technological standard. Indigenous developments are based on foreign licenses. Austrian exports of digital telecom equipment are very scarce. All in all, we face a case of ``adaptive government procurement´´ rather than one of "development government procurement".
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Introduction
The present study describes the introduction of the Austrian digital switching system, OES, and valuates the technological, economical, and societal effects of this step. The system has been procured by the public Austrian telecom provider, ÖPTV, and is thus, an example of public technology procurement.
Our approach follows the conceptual approach of National Innovation Systems. Consequently, we identify the main players of the `procurement game´ and describe their specific relationships to each other. We examine the effects of the procurement process on innovation and competiveness of the Austrian telecom industry. Furthermore, we discuss the differences of the Austrian solution to EU-regulations valid today.
In the remaining sub-sections of the introduction we give a sketchy historical background of the Austrian telecom sector and give a short description of the procurement case to be studied. In section two we discuss the institutional background of the procurement process, giving some insight to the Austrian economic system, the Austrian innovation system, Austrian technology policy, and the procurement habits used in the Austrian telecom sector.
In section three, we identify the organizations involved in the procurement process. We also discuss other organizations not participating and try to explain why only parts of the Austrian innovation system were involved. In chapter four we analyze the procurement process, describing the mechanisms which led to the system choice and the subsequent development and procurement of OES. Chapter five gives our appraisal of the societal and industrial results of the introduction of the Austrian digital switching system. A summary concludes the paper.
Historical Background
In 1861, the German teacher Philipp Reis invented a new communication system. 2 In the same year he presented his apparatus in Austria. There was little interest. In 1883 an improved version was demonstrated to the Austrian emperor, who considered it as an amusing toy. At the World Fair of 1876, Graham Bell exhibited his telephone. He found little enthusiasm. In 1877 his invention was presented at a session of the Society of Natural Science in Innsbruck, the capital of Tyrolia.
The first installation of a telephone in Austria took place in 1881 at a factory in Dornbirn, Vorarlberg. Also in 1881, after two years of waiting, the Austrian ministry of economic affairs granted a licence to the `Wiener-Privat-Telegraphen-Gesellschaft´, which allowed them to install a telephone net with a diameter of 15 kilometers round the St. Stephen´s Cathedral. The company started with 154 lines. The increase in lines reaching 3.749.087 in 1995, is depicted in Figure 1 . 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Source: Günther (1992 ), p.24, ÖPTV-Geschäftsberichte 1994 In 1892, all private telephone societies were nationalized. In 1910, the first automatic dial systems were installed. By 1927, the new system had replaced most operators in Austria. In 1922, the first telecommunication line was laid from Innsbruck to Bregenz. The first fardistance cable was installed in 1921 between Vienna and Nürnberg in Germany. This cable completed a line from London to Istambul.
During World War II, most exchanges were damaged or destroyed. The new foundation of ÖPTV after the war allowed for the introduction of the new uniform dialling system, W 48, which had been developed through close co-operation by engineers of ÖPTV and the Austrian telecom industry. In 1950, the first coaxial cables were laid. Austria´s first automated exchange was installed in Vienna in 1956. In 1964, telecommunication with Germany and Switzerland was automatized. One year later, Austria participated in the first commercial news satellite `Early Bird´.
Figure 2: The Development of the Austrian Telecom System
Source: Adapted from a lecture sheet of the director of ÖFEG, H.Geirhofer. In 1969, the first Pulse Code Modulation system (PCM) was introduced. By 1972, the complete automatization of the Austrian network was finished. The system was electromechanic and analogue. Wired logic components were partly digital. Figure 2 gives a short summary of the development of the Austrian telecom net, where the lowest line gives the product names. 3 Only the Stored Program Control -Pulse Code Modulation systems (SPC-PCM) are completely digital and will be discussed in this paper.
The Procurement Case Studied
In 1976, the Austrian telecom provider, Österreichische Post-und Telegraphenverwaltung (ÖPTV), faced serious problems: The demand for telecommunication in Austria was still quickly increasing. The number of lines was to increase from 1.390.456 in 1974 to 2.033.351 in 1979 . Forecasts rightly predicted an increase of at least further 2 million by 2000. ÖPTV already employed about 60.000 people, including about 19.000 in the telecommunication department. ÖPTV could not afford any further increase in cost. Most of the equipment in densely populated areas still stemmed from the efforts of the post-war reconstruction phase and was obsolete. Switching was expensive because its maintenance tied up a lot of room and personnel. On average, ÖPTV needed 3,6 employees per link then, a number reduced to 0.9 in the Nineties.
ÖPTV reacted to this situation by digitalizing its switching system. Having little technological know-how in the matter, it founded a company to devolop criteria for the choice of a digital system and to elaborate specifications for an adaptation of the system to Austrian requirements. ÖPTV held 50,4 per cent of the shares of this company named Österreichische Fernmeldetechnische Entwicklungs-und Förderungsgesellschaft (ÖFEG). The remaining 49,6 per cent were divided equally among the four Austrian suppliers of telecom equipment, ITT Austria, Kapsch, Schrack and Siemens Österreich. In their joint company ÖFEG, R&D-staff of all five partners co-operated in finding a solution to the above problems.
The goals of the procurement process were diverse and sometimes conflicting. The original idea was to introduce a uniform computerized digital system in Austria to replace the outdated equipment. In this way a genuine Austrian system called Österreichisches Einheitssystem (OES) was to be established. The primary goals were related to economic efficiency of ÖPTV: To renew obsolete components, to increase capacity, to introduce value added services, and to rationalize maintenance by automation and centralized management 4 . Additional goals were formulated in §3 of the ÖFEG contract, namely to maximize the Austrian value added, to acquire and realize technological know-how, and to establish genuine development. The implicit objective of these goals was national welfare rather than profit optimization. Together with the construction of ÖFEG itself these latter goals, thus, indicate that ÖPTV saw itself not only as an commercial entity but beyond that as an instrument of Austrian economic policy. Finally, from interviews with experts, who participated in the procurement process, an additional goal has been mentioned, namely speed of system introduction. Though not formulated explicitly, this goal indicates a certain pragmatism, which influenced the choice of the digital system. Following recommendations of ÖFEG, ÖPTV decided that ÖFEG should take a licence from Northern Telecom and adapt their system DMS 100 to Austrian needs. By political influence this decision was reversed. According to our interviews and the literature available, political influence had produced a variety of implicit goals, most of which were of economic nature. The basic idea was to import technology for Austrian firms co-operating in increasing exports and employment in the telecom sector. From the standpoint of national security, preservation of independence in an infrastructure considered vital for the Austrian economy, was a major goal.
In the next section we examine the background of this situation. Suffice it to say, at this stage, that in 1981, the minister of transport finally decided to procure two systems, DMS 100 from Northern Telecom, and EWSD from Siemens. OES now stood for Österreichisches Elektronisches System, the word `uniform´ having been changed to `electronic´, and the two subsystems were called OES-D, based on the DMS-solution, and OES-E, based on EWSD. Both systems were to be licenced abroad and partially produced in Austria. The Austrian digital switching system would operate on the Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) principle, introduced for increased reliability and efficiency in use. It would also use the Stored Program Control (SPC) principle, which would allow for greater flexibility and value added services. Digitalization of the anologue signal would not happen at the client level but in the exchange. PCM-30 would allow for 30 simultaneous calls and signals in time multiplex and for the common channel signalling system no.7.
Having co-operated closely before, the Austrian firms Kapsch and Schrack founded a joint development company named Austrian Telecommunication (AT). To produce OES-D on the basis of the Canadian DMS 100, AT bought the respective licence from Northern Telecom and adapted the system according to the specifications elaborated by ÖFEG. The Austrian subsidiaries of Siemens and ITT were less natural partners. They co-operated on basis of an development association named Arbeitsgemeinschaft OES-E, Siemens, Alcatel (AOSA). They took a licence from Siemens in Germany and adapted EWSD to Austrian specifications, again conforming with the specifications formulated by ÖFEG.
By 1985 the first two switching exchanges went into operation. The plan was to complete digitalization within thirty years. Actually, the digitalization of the Austrain telecom switching system will be completed by 1999.
The Institutional Framework
We adopt four approaches to gain some insight to the institutional framework of our procurement case: First, we describe the Austrian political and economic system which is particularly influenced by Social Partnership. 5 We do so in order to discuss the political influence on the choice of the digital system used for OES. Second, we try to present some features of the Austrian innovation system to be able to assess the importance of the given procurement case for the technological change in Austria. Third, we give some basic information on Austrian technology policy for the given time interval. Finally, we give a short sketch of the usual procurement routines in the telecom sector of the time.
The Austrian Social Partnership
After the second world war, rebuilding the Austrian economy seemed a natural task for the public hand. Reconstruction was planned centrally. Most of the Austrian heavy industry and infrastructure remained in public hand. Steel, mining, chemicals, energy, automotive industry and public transport were state-owned. Moreover, the public hand held the majority of all major banks. Most important for our study, the sole Austrian post and telecom provider (ÖPTV) was organized as a section of the ministry of transport and, thus, subject to public administration. Not until 1996, was ÖPTV privatized as a stock corporation and renamed Post und Telekom Austria AG (PTA).
In the post-war period the independence of Austria hinged on close collaboration of all Austrian interest groups. The coalition of the two large parties, the socialist and the people´s party (SPÖ and ÖVP), in the years between 1945 and 1966, laid the foundation for the Social Partnership.
6 Its most important political instrument came to be the Paritätische Kommission (PK), where the representatives of the Economic Chamber, the Agricultural Chambers, the Workers´ Chamber and the Federation of Trade Unions traditionally find compromises on all potential economic conflicts in Austria. Most Chamber memberships are compulsory, which implies that the degree of organization in Austria is extremely high. The Workers´ Chamber has been created as a service organization for Austria´s workers and employees just to produce parity between right-and left-wing interests in the commission. Membership is obligatory for all Austrian employees and workers.
There are sub-commissions of the PK elaborating recommendations on prices and wages but also on most other important issues of economic and social life in Austria. Despite being an inofficial instrument without formal constitutional backing, the PK has been of tremendous influence in the country. Only in recent years has the government started to deviate from the recommendations of the PK. The Social Partnership is an expression of an Austrian tradition of seeking to evade conflicts and to find compromises. It has meant letting left-and right-wing interest groups participate in the management of the nationalized industries as well as solving the wage struggles in private industries without strikes. Close personal contacts and a joint orientation towards exports seem logical consequences of being a small and highly 5 English for Sozialpartnerschaft. 6 In the meantime the former Socialist Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs) has changed its name to Socialdemocratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs). concentrated economy. The decision on procurement of a digital switching system in Austria has to be related to this economic culture.
It is interesting to notice that this culture of `forced harmony´ only changed at about the same time that Austria entered the EU. The EU-membership is an indication of a tendency towards liberalization and was accompanied by a wave of privatizations. Former government officials now find themselves in the position of managers of private enterprises subject to fierce international competition. In 1976, nevertheless, the European Community had no direct effect on the procurement process of the Austrian digital switching system. The introduction of new European procurement rules associated with the Single Market in 1989 did not apply to Austrian procurement and were not followed. Indirectly, however, the formulation of technical standards on the EU-level influenced the Austrian decision.
One typical result of close personal contacts was the partition of markets. In 1976 this situation also prevailed in the telecom sector and had its influence on procurement. There was a certain amount of competition between the suppliers trying to increase their respective quotas by intruding on a competitor´s market segment. This was no vital threat to the competitors, however. The government had a strong commitment to involve all national firms in order to maintain a high employment level. The government did not face restrictive legislation forcing specific procurement procedures like public tenders, at least not in the telecom sector. Nor did consumer preferences play a role. The Workers´ Chamber, considered as Austria´s main consumers´ representative, basically voted for employment, not for low prices or inexpensive technical solutions.
Features of the Austrian Innovation System
An exact description of the Austrian system of innovation is not possible within this framework. We keep this section short and simple by just concentrating on a few distinctive features of the system. Before we discuss any details, we compare Austrian gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) as a per centage of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the Austrian technology balance of payments (TBP) to their counterparts in other selected countries. The results are given in Table 2 .2.1. According to these indicators, Austria spends little on research and development (R&D) and is a net importer of technology. 1995, p.146, 178 We distinguish, as a matter of course, Industry, higher education organizations (like universities), and non-university research organizations. We try to estimate their relative importance for Austrian research by writing up their respective expenditures for R&D. In the case of Austria, these numbers are relatively constant: 7 Industry pays for about 57,3 per cent of R&D, the numbers for educational organizations and other research organizations are 35,3 per cent and 7,3 per cent, respectively. Compared to other countries, the share of industry in research is relatively low. From patent analyses, it emerges that industry concentrates its R&D efforts in traditional fields like construction or transport. Austrian universities, on the other hand, usually have a very broad spectrum of research topics without outstanding national specialization.
As for Austrian industry, research efforts are charactarized by two features: First, in comparison to other developed countries, industry spends little on R&D. Second, out of these small R&D-budgets, little R&D is commissioned outside: Only 1,4 per cent of the Austrian industry´s R&D-budget is commissioned to universities and only 2 per cent to other research organizations. Without the two largest research centers, ARCS and Joanneum Research, this two per cent reduces to 0,3 per cent. Thus, considering the systems analysis approach, the links between the Austrian R&D-organizations are rather weak.
The government traditionally concentrates its financial support on universities. About 71 per cent of the public research budget are allocated to higher education organizations. Universities execute little commissioned research, however. As mentioned above, the links between industry and universities are weak. About 97 per cent of the universities´ research budget are financed by the public hand, only about 2 per cent are financed by industry.
Features of Austrian Technology Policy
To stay focused on telecommunication, we keep this chapter as sketchy as the previous one. Explicit Austrian technology policy started in 1966, when a report on Austrian R&D by the OECD showed Austria´s poor performance. This resulted in the foundation of the Austrian Industrial Research Promotion Fund (FFF) and the Austrian Scientific Research Promotion Fund (FWF). These funds grant project-dependent subsidies to industrial and scientific research studies and projects.
In 1970 the Socialist Party (SPÖ) won the majority in Austria and presented their first government. They founded the Austrian ministry for science and research (BMWF) in the same year. In 1973, after the economic crisis following the oil shortage by OPEC, the BMWF organized project teams on crucial technological topics. These teams consisted of experts and representatives of interest, who were to analyze the technological field in question and to elaborate policy instruments to meet the respective technological, economical, and societal problems. In the Mid-Seventies, electronics and information technologies were a recurrent topic.
Strangely enough, telecommunication was never treated by a project team, with one exception. We discuss this exception below. The reason for `non-existence´ of certain topics can be argued in the following way: There existed government organizations in ministries taking care of telecommunication, traffic, energy, health, and other topics. We already mentioned that the Austrian post and telecom agency was a section of the ministry of transport. Following the logic of budgetary competence, telecommunication was thus a topic already taken care of. Governmental planners saw no need to devote further financial efforts of other ministries on technological lags, which, by definition, were not supposed to exist. In case of financial shortage, it was the duty of the minister of transport to take care of sufficient promotion of research on telecommunication. Results of this logic were the fragmentation of Austrian technology policy and a lack in incentive compatibility with respect to innovation.
The only exception to the rule was an extraordinary initiative: In 1977, a programme promoting a Multipurpose Universally Programmable Intelligent Decoder (MUPID) was launched. ÖPTV was ready to buy this advanced and heavily subsidized videotex-system. According to a government plan, MUPID should have been produced by a joint venture of Siemens, Philips, Elin, and Voest. The plan failed, firstly, because Siemens decided to develop an own system, secondly, because Voest entered a restructuring phase, thirdly, because the manager then organizing production faced legal prosecution, and finally, because the inventor developed the necessary software further, such that it could be used with a personal computer. The result of this project and the financial loss were harsh shocks to the managers of ÖPTV. A concerted technology programme of this size was never tried again. For the Austrian telecommunication industry this implied that from then on they faced a rather conservative and pragmatic procurer.
Procurement Habits in the Telecommunication Sector
Up to the decision of digitalizing the switching system, the procurement procedure usually used by ÖPTV was to invite the suppliers to solve a certain technical problem specified by ÖPTV and to prove applicability by erecting a trial facility at own cost. ÖPTV then decided on whether the system fitted its needs. If it did not, the facility had to be removed and there was no financial compensation for the supplier. This shows that ÖPTV had enough monopsonistic power to shift all risk to the producers. In the case of digitalization it chose a different procedure which implied riskless participation of all major suppliers. This strategy can partly be explained by ambitions beyond the primary goals of capacity increase and cost reduction. It is difficult to decide how important this aspect has been, however, because ÖPTV was also in urgent need of technological know-how, which led to early involvement of private firms in the decision process.
The Key Organizations Involved
The main players of the present procurement game were the monopsonistic Austrian telecom provider, ÖPTV the Austrian government, in particular the chancellor and the minister of transport the participants in the Austrian Social Partnership as described in the previous section the Austrian Telephone Development and Promotion Company (ÖFEG) the suppliers, that is, both parent companies and Austrian subsidiaries of Siemens and ITT (now Alcatel), and the two genuine Austrian firms, Kapsch and Schrack (now Ericsson) the two private development organizations founded by the suppliers, AT and AOSA
The Austrian Telecom Provider
As stated earlier, the first initiative to digitalize the Austrian switching system was set by ÖPTV, which faced capacity and cost problems. In the beginning, however, it was only clear that the Austrian switching system needed renewal. The first step in the decision process was a commitment to digitalization. This was not an evident decision, for two reasons: First, most digital systems sold world-wide still were untested, especially in respect to reliability, software and capacity problems. Second, the Austrian know-how on digital systems was rather poor. At Austrian universities, digital technics were an optional subject, at best. At ÖPTV there existed some basic knowledge stemming from journals and international meetings like the International Switching Symposium, but no detailed information existed. The decision reflected the international discussion which just at that time changed its topic from `Why Going Digital?´ to `How to go Digital?´. Another influential factor was the elaboration of signal standards by the International Telecom Union (ITU). There had been, moreover, contacts to Austrian firms from the very beginning, and it is known that at least the two genuine Austrian firms, Kapsch and Schrack, strongly favored a digital solution. Though the decision was taken by ÖPTV, it is hard to judge how strong the industry´s influence had actually been.
As there was no further information available at Austrian universities and research institutes, ÖPTV used its traditional contacts to the Austrian telecom industry to fill its information gaps. At that time, Austria had no significant production of digital components. In the case of Kapsch and Schrack, the technological know-how concerning the development of digital systems was limited. Based on a joint development with AEG-Telefunken, Kapsch put a semielectronic pilot-exchange (OHS/fixed wired logic) in service in 1967 and started to develop and produce PCM 30 technology based products in 1973 and SPC controlled equipment in 1976 (ZM1, ZUP, C-wire multiplexer). There was not enough competence to offer an integrated network, however, nor the ability to develop one within a reasonable time span.
Through their contacts to their parent companies, the Austrian subsidiaries of Siemens and ITT disposed of some rudimentary know-how. The parent houses of Siemens, Philips, and ITT worked on their own digital Systems: Siemens worked on EWSD, Philips on PRX, and ITT on its Systems 12-30 and 12-40. None were produced in Austria, however, and only Siemens had started first capacity testing in Germany and South-Africa. The European digital systems existed mainly on drawing boards, especially in respect to the software. Basically, ÖPTV faced three possible strategies for the introduction of its digital system: Direct licensing abroad, leaving the development and adaptation work to the supplier(s) Licensing abroad combined with development and adaptation in Austria Development of a genuine Austrian system ÖPTV could not afford the investments for developing an own system, especially in respect to the build-up of human capital. It was calculated that the third alternative would cost at least 1000 additional man-years and that meant more expert hours than available in Austria. The Swiss experience has shown, in fact, that this calculation was still rather optimistic. On the other hand, there was a strong inclination towards protecting the home industry. Furthermore, there was a commitment to retain all Austrian services which had been introduced before digitalization. The consumer should not notice the dramatic change in the network, at least not by missing already existing functions of the net. A decision for the second alternative was thus taken.
Within ÖPTV, the development department plays a special role. The Fernmeldetechnisches Zentralamt (FZA) as development agency of the Austrian telecom provider is responsible for system support and internationalization (ETSI, ITU). The old FZA team participated in the foundation of ÖFEG and some FZA employees were taken over to ÖFEG. There once was a certain degree of competition between FZA and ÖFEG, where the latter worked out more than 95 per cent of all specifications. By now the duties are clearly separated and collaboration is frictionless.
The Government and the Social Partnership
The Austrian post and telecom provider, ÖPTV, was organized as a section of the ministry of transport. The Austrian government, thus, had direct access to any decision regarding the telecom net. The ÖPTV itself acted as a public institution within a framework of goals far exceeding profit optimization. It perceived itself as an instrument for social policy rather than a business company. Thus, the decision had to be made in favour of a domestic supplier. The ÖPTV´s main objective, however, was to rationalize switching in order to increase capacity and to reduce costs. To the decision makers within ÖPTV, who were mostly technicians, a uniform network was a natural choice.
There have been voices from the very beginning, stating that a two-system decision would be superior because it would reduce dependence on the supplier licensing the system. There are different opinions, however, as to whether this argument really has been decisive in the end. It certainly has not been within ÖPTV.
The chairmen of the works councils of the major firms in Austria were very powerful men. In Austria, they were called `Betriebskaiser´, an expression perhaps best translated by `works emperor´. Within an highly concentrated work force their influence, directly as well as by help of the president of the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions (ÖGB), has been extremely influential. The president of the ÖGB is sometimes considered the second most powerful man of that period after the chancellor. The socialist chancellor depended on political help on behalf of the trade unions and was, thus, eager to take a decision in their favour. Though not giving official statements, all interviewed experts thought that the chancellor himself interfered and decided to include the Siemens system, EWSD.
Such a co-operative solution went better with the Austrian culture than the choice of only one system. Siemens was considered as an important economic factor in Austria and, actually, plays a particular role in Austria´s technology policy up to the present day. 8 Regarding the decision to take two systems, the social partners put up little opposition against the minister of transport, who decided officially, and the chancellor, who as the driving force of `AustroKeynesianism´, decided behind the curtains. The Austrian Economic Chamber, usually the main opponent of the Austrian trade unions, agreed to the chancellor´s solomonic verdict. Their approving position has not changed over the years. The Austrian employersó rganizations and the Federation of Austrian Industry also accepted a solution which seemed in their interest. It represented a `culture of friendship´ as an expert said. The alternatives were considered as fatal to home production and human capital formation.
The chancellor himself had an inclination to large enterprises. He wanted to attract foreign capital and to bring production and development centers of multinational firms to Austria. It is hard to guess what would have happened if ÖPTV had decided for a system of Philips or Siemens in the first place. As it was, avoidance of a provocation of Siemens was certainly not inconsistent with the chancellor´s general economic policy.
The Austrian Telephone Development and Promotion Company
Not finding enough competence in Austria, ÖPTV, as a section of the transport ministry, decided to build up technical know-how on a national basis before taking the system decision. In the tradition of a centrally planned economy, ÖPTV bundled all national competence by founding the Österreichische Fernmeldetechnische Entwicklungs-und Förderungs-gesellschaft, ÖFEG, in 1978 In this partnership, the Austrian Republic held 50,4 per cent of the shares, and the other four parties held the rest, share and share alike (12,4 per cent each). It was, at the same time, a good example of outsourcing, a rather modern concept then. ÖFEG was to provide the necessary preconditions for the production of electronical digital telephone systems in Austria. ÖFEG was, moreover, responsible for the gradual implementation of OES into the existing network, which implied an evolutionary process. Further long-term tasks were the introduction of a common channel signalling system, actually introduced in 1990/91, of an Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), and of an Operation, Adminstration and Maintenance System (OAM), both introduced in 1992/93.
All partners were invited to present system solutions within ÖFEG. ÖPTV threatened to develop its own solution in case the other partners did not co-operate. A closing date for entries was fixed. After this date, by joint team work, valuation criteria were to be developed as a basis for the choice of one system. These criteria, combined with weighting factors provided by ÖPTV, were used for the final choice. We describe the formal decision process in more detail in the next chapter.
Collaboration within ÖFEG was sometimes hard because of the different economic interests of the respective parties. As to the staff from the four companies, there were manỳ engineering artists´. They had considerable knowledge on electro-mechanical systems and were used to solve technical problems from the very basics. Adaptation of an existing digital system by such highly trained personnel led to some `radical´ solutions and basic criticism of the systems they were to adapt. As a consequence, discussions and sometimes conflicts with the parent companies abroad evolved. The ÖPTV-fraction within ÖFEG, consisting of selected ÖPTV-staff members, tried to stay neutral. One effect of the conflicts was a natural selection process. Engineers with higher ability to adapt and to be satisfied with conservative solutions, had better chances to stay. Some critics think that this led to the breeding of development officials´ at ÖFEG, who show little mobility.
ÖFEG itself was kept out of all price negotiations. There was some bargaining on the technological criteria formulated as a basis for the choice of a digital system but no discussion of prices. In the end, ÖPTV dominated the decision process, reflecting the majority in shares held by the ministry of transport. The exclusion of price considerations was necessary to create a culture of open talk, which resulted in a more or less harmonic elaboration of the criteria needed for the system choice. This in itself, as well as the rather smooth collaboration with the development firms, can be considered a success.
In 1997, following the year of the privatization of the Austrian post, the new telecom provider, PTA, became sole shareholder of ÖFEG. Since then, contracts have been signed only with AT and AOSA. The present ÖFEG-contract is valid until 1999. No interviewed expert dared to forecast future developments beyond that date.
The Suppliers
There have been four supplier companies in Austria. Their present key figures are shown in Table 3 .4.1. Siemens Österreich is obviously the largest of the four, even if only the core company, Siemens AG Österreich, is considered. Only two of the companies, Siemens and Kapsch, have survived in their original form. ITT became Alcatel, and Schrack has been bought by Ericsson. One of the major turning points at the beginning stages of the procurement process was the licence choice by Kapsch. They did not choose Philips or another European partner, but Northern Telecom and its digital system, DMS 100. It was the most advanced system in terms of commercialization and there were operational switching exchanges ready to visit. Furthermore, it was considered as a reliable blue-collar system in the sense that less expensive specialists were needed for its maintenance. Maintainance could partly be done by semiskilled workmen due to early implementation of a user-friendly surface. The Philips system PRX was considered as technologically inferior and actually was no commercial success world-wide. As a result of the decision by Kapsch, Philips retreated from the Austrian public telecom market and is not a main player in this sector today.
Here is a good example how Austrian Social Partnership works: By personal contacts Kapsch gained the support of high representatives of the Workers´ Chamber and the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions. An official government delegation consisting of the Chief of the Chancelor´s Cabinet, the Secretary of the Minister of Transport, and the Head of Transport Division in the Workers´ Chamber visited Northern Telecom for a hearing. The workersŕ epresentatives favored a solution which gave Northern Telecom a chance to intrude the European market dominated by national champions. The result was a good licence contract for Kapsch and Schrack, which from then on lobbied the system in Austria. Kapsch enticed an engineer away from ITT and made him responsible for the adaptation development of DMS 100. In ÖFEG, Kapsch and Schrack co-operated to push DMS 100.
After the final system decision in 1981, Kapsch and Schrack founded a company to develop DMS along the standards formulated by ÖFEG. Schrack stayed in this company, named Austrian Telecommunication (AT), until 1995, when Kapsch bought its share after Schrack´s take-over by Ericsson. As to Siemens, they considered themselves as natural favorites and had good reasons to be optimistic. Siemens is one of the oldest telecom suppliers in Austria. They had founded a first subsidiary in Vienna in 1859, which had to be closed in 1864 due to weak demand. In 1879, it was re-opened with 50 employees under the name `Wiener Technisches Büro von S. H. Berlin´. Since 1971, the Austrian Republic held 43.6 per cent of the shares of this Austrian subsidiary, by then named `Siemens AG Österreich´. Siemens had the largest employment of Austria´s telecom industry and an active works council acting in favor of their digital system. Under a socialist government this was a definite advantage. Furthermore, their system, EWSD, was further developed than System 12-40 at the time and had less capacity problems. Most important of all, there existed trial facilities which could be visited.
ITT and Siemens
EWSD
was not yet fully developed. According to European tradition, it was a system needing highly skilled personnel. Integration of the central operation, administration and management system (OAM) was realized later than in the case of DMS 100. According to ÖFEG-experts, the two systems are considered as more or less equivalent today and require a portion of about 65 per cent of semi-skilled personnel. There had been no extensive testing in the case of EWSD, however, which raised doubts about the reliability of the system under workaday conditions. Visits of Austrian decision makers in Munich were not attended to by high-rank Siemens technicians but by marketing experts unable to explain technical details. Some managers of Siemens and ITT thought that Kapsch, having no own know-how, would not be able to adapt DMS 100 to Austrian specifications, anyway.
The Development Organizations
When ÖPTV still looked for one system, ÖFEG was intended to take the licence and to develop the Austrian adaptations. All supplying firms were to co-operate within ÖFEG, not only to find criteria for the choice of the system, but also to elaborate Austrian specifications for the adaptation of the system and to develop jointly along these specifications.
Due to the two-systems decision two licences were needed for OES. Two development organizations were founded instead of joint development within ÖFEG. Two suppliers cooperated in each of these development companies, respectively. In the case of Kapsch and Schrack, this was easy as the two had co-operated closely before. They founded Austrian Telecommunication (AT) in order to adapt DMS 100 to Austrian standards. Only by close cooperation with Northern Telecom and through the efforts of a young, hard-working team, did they succeed in adapting the system. They hired a young engineer from ITT and made him chief of development. Up to the present day, however, there are experts who are surprised about the fact that Kapsch and Schrack, having practically no know-how in digital switching systems, were able to intrude and defend a market completely new to them. By now, about 250 people are employed for the development of OES-D.
The licence of EWSD sold by Siemens, was bought by its Austrian subsidiary and by ITT Austria. Speaking to representatives of Alcatel Austria (formerly ITT Austria), the humiliation still can be felt. ITT had the reputation of being technologically advanced, although the Austrian branch had no research field of ist own. ITT had its own system, which was the only one not accepted in the end. The shock led to a complete re-orientation of the Austrian subsidiary. Development was concentrated on private automatic branch exchanges, financed by the surplus from OES-sales.
Co-operation between Siemens and Alcatel is considered as productive by experts of both firms. Trust never reached a level to allow for the foundation of a joint firm, however. Only by regulatory influence, that is, by procurement of OES, could the two competitors be induced to form the development association named Entwicklungszentrum OES-E (EZ OES-E). This association was later renamed Arbeitsgemeinschaft OES-E, Siemens, Alcatel (AOSA). Austrian engineers from ITT and Siemens Austria went to Munich to become acquainted with EWSD. Experts of both Siemens and Alcatel agreed that such a co-operation would not have been possible without OES. Siemens technicians suspect that the joint effort to adapt EWSD to Austrian standards has led to a certain technology transfer. Experts from Alcatel doubt that this transfer could be relevant as ITT worked on its own, different, digital system.
Currently the association AOSA has about 160 employees, and about 65 employees work on the development of OES-E. At the time of the foundation of the association, the number of developers had been higher (about 85) whereas the remaining staff, mostly marketing, had been smaller (about 20).
A closer co-operation between the AT-group and the AOSA group would have been possible if the OAM-system of the digital net, procured since 1989, could have been made a joint effort. Such a plan faced strong resistance by all suppliers, however. Kapsch argues, that the high degree of system specific OAM features necessary for the DMS 100 switch to run on an outside OAM computer platform would have made a joint effort futile. In the end, the ÖPTV conceded to this heavy opposition, and each group developed its own version of OAM. This produced higher costs because of a doubled development effort, and will also be a long-term burden due to higher maintenance costs and lower compatibility within the system.
Organizations not Involved
Following the concept of National Innovation Systems and considering the previous section, it is also interesting to note which players did not participate in the digitalization of the Austrian switching system:
Austrian universities other public research organizations research organizations abroad consumer organizations (apart from the Workers´ Chamber) private consultancies
Austrian universities and research centers did not have enough technological know-how to be considered helpful by ÖPTV. Given the strong influence by politicians trying to build up national competence, however, it is interesting that there were no attempts to involve academia. Until the nineties there were practically no professional links between the human capital employed by ÖFEG, AT, and AOSA, on one hand, and the universities, on the other. This indicates that the digitalization process implied little research but rather pure development. Apart from some private experts giving lectures at universities there was no attempt to complement the efforts of ÖPTV and the suppliers by public science institutions. The same applies to potential links between the research & development departments of the parent companies abroad and Austrian academia.
Another possibility not considered was to entrust national or foreign consultancies or research organizations with feasibility studies or technological research facilitating the decision on the system choice. It seems that this idea has never been discussed. Recalling the sketch of the Austrian economic culture, however, this is perhaps less surprising than the absence of universities.
Finally, there has been no market analysis, and no consumer representatives have been involved in the decision process. Although some experts in private firms hint at the differences in viewpoint this might have caused, most decision makers in ÖPTV and ÖFEG still think today that consideration of consumer preferences would have led to qualitatively inferior and technologically conservative solutions. Leaving the decision to technicians has, in their view, led to quicker and more efficient introduction of high technological standards. We will return to this point, too, in the sections to come.
Organization and Management of the Procurement Process
In chapter 2.4 we gave a short description of the procurement habits in the telecom sector before the introduction of OES. The procedure chosen for the procurement of OES was completely different to these habits, shifting power to the suppliers. One obvious reason for this is the lack of technological competence in Austria. Theoretically, only two Austrian companies, ITT and Siemens, had the potential to erect trial facilities. ÖPTV had little means to evaluate the success of these facilities, however, as there was no knowledge on potential alternatives. This lack of knowledge added to a certain political interest in the organization of the Austrian telecom sector. The result was the foundation of ÖFEG which allowed also other competitors than the above two subsidiaries of multinational companies to contend for a contract. Recall, moreover, that the Austrian telecom sector had already been highly organized before the introduction of OES. In some respect the co-operative form of procurement is a logical consequence of the market structure which had similarities to a cartel on the supply side even before digitalization of the Austrian network had been considered.
Both the choice of the system OES and its development and introduction have been long-term evolutionary processes. The decision on the system to be procured involved the foundation of an independent company and, in spite of that, was revised. Procurement itself started in 1985 and is still going on. We devote one sub-section to the decision process and to the procurement management, respectively. In a third sub-section, we add a short discussion on the cost aspect of the present procurement case and on the revenue shares of the suppliers. We add a sub-section on discussing advantages and disadvantages of the two-systems solution. In a fifth sub-section, we try to assess the influence of nepotism on procurement of OES.
System Choice
Discussing the process of choice of the Austrian digital switching system, three phases can be distinguished:
Decisions taken before the foundation of ÖFEG Decisions based on the criteria elaborated by ÖFEG Decisions based on political influence after the choice by ÖPTV
Basic Decisions on the Procurement Process
The first phase, starting 1976, was a period of gathering information about possible steps towards rationalization of the Austrian telecom network. It ended 1978 with the foundation of ÖFEG. Primary goals were 10 to renew certain components of the net which were obsolete. to increase the capacity of the net. to introduce value added services for the public. to rationalize mainainance by automation and centralized management.
In this phase, ÖPTV laid down the rules of the game: The most important decision was to introduce a purely digital system and to use the new opportunities of computerized operation. This decision was made in 1977. The information necessary was found by international journals and meetings as well as by personal contacts and consultation of available suppliers. Though not undisputed, it was the right decision and showed far-sightedness on behalf of the officials of ÖPTV. By the time the decision finally fell, however, it was like `entering a running train´, as an PTA-manager put it.
A second decision was to introduce one uniform system completely compatible to functionalities already existing in the Austrian network. Most managers of ÖPTV realized the role of their public company for Austrian economic policy. They were mostly engineers, however, and the decision for just one system seemed straightforward at the time. Seen from the present and after a period of liberalization and privatization, it is also interesting to notice how the demand side was considered. It was a political decision that the consumer should not notice any changes going on in the net. The above decision implied that already existing services had to be preserved at all cost. There was no attempt to analyze the demand side of the market, that is, to examine whether the consumer would have preferred, for example, less services at lower cost. Most decision makers of the Austrian telecom provider thought that they knew best what is good for the public. They were ambitious in the sense that they wanted a technologically advanced system for Austria. A soft spot for technical details was widespread.
The third decision was to adapt an existing system to Austrian needs instead of developing an indigenous system or of buying a turn-key system. ÖPTV thought that there were too few Austrian resources for the development of an indigenous system, which would thus have been too expensive as an alternative. Similar experiences in Switzerland show that this intuition was right. The second alternative, payment for adaptation abroad and taking a licence for the finished product, was ruled out for political reasons. This alternative would have resulted in lower domestic employment and a higher degree of technological dependence, consequences contrary to the policy goals of the government.
A fourth decision was to include the suppliers of ÖPTV in the decision process. Informal contacts were institutionalized by the foundation of ÖFEG. Goals formulated in §3 of the ÖFEG contract are maximization of the Austrian value added. acquisition and realization of technological know-how. Establishment of genuine development.
By knowledge of the explicit goals discussed in this chapter, it is already possible at this stage to explain why certain prominent solutions in other EU-countries were not considered. Most American systems or the French E10 were no candidates because the systems were not produced in Austria and, even more basic, they were not purely digital.
No links to the research community were established, be it domestic or abroad. One reason was that there existed little know-how on the topic at Austrian universities. This also indicates, however, that telecommunication was not seen as a research topic. The chosen strategies were pragmatic in the sense that a given technology was to be installed in Austria. The idea was to adapt an advanced international standard to the Austrian situation. Further research in order to become an international leader was not part of the strategy. As to further developments, ÖPTV waited for international standards. Austria had not participated in basic developments in the field of digitalization and there were few research resources, both physical and human. The priority of ÖPTV was to solve their capacity and cost problem.
The Decision Criteria Elaborated by ÖFEG
This phase, when the basically technological criteria for the choice of the system were elaborated in detail, started with the foundation of ÖFEG and ended with the system decision by ÖPTV in 1981.
The first goals of ÖFEG were to describe the systems already existing in Austria and to formulate criteria for the choice and adaptation of an uniform digital system named OES. All in all, it took about 40 man-years to describe about 100 interfaces. Of these 100 interfaces, 30 were retained. The new system thus had to be adapted to these 30 interfaces. Some experts say that this number could have been reduced further which would have saved some cost. Others say that the chosen strategy allowed for a smooth transition and preserved employment, factors more relevant than an insignificant cost reduction. It should be mentioned in this context that most employees of ÖPTV were permanent government officials. If they had lost their field of duties by rationalization, they would have had to be employed somewhere else within ÖPTV. Both management and works council saw limited possibilities beyond the above reduction of interfaces. Still, there have been disputes on the topic.
Considerable effort was mobilized to achieve an objective choice based on internationally acceptable rules and decision practice. As to the choice criteria, five decision trees were elaborated, containing more than 650 single criteria. The decision trees were based on the following five categories:
Users: Criteria concerning the features of introduction for the consumer, functional properties, and future services. Operation and Management: Criteria concerning reliability, operability and administration, maintanance, documentation and necessary staff. Technical Concept: Criteria concerning the concept of the system, the fundamentals of the design, and technical problems with respect to its realization. Installation and Planning: Criteria concerning the overall planning, necessary documents and records, and the dimensions of the system Suitability for Introduction in Austria: Criteria concerning the match with the profile of requirements, the suitability for adaptation, and the intricacy of introduction.
The 650 criteria were related to these five trees and arranged on the different levels of the tree structure. Within the trees, they were weighted according to a subjective valuation given by ÖPTV. The trees allowed a ranking of the potential systems on a scale between 1 and 100 per cent, where 100 per cent meant that all thinkable requirements were met. Given the difficulties of adaptation and comparability, the best possible result for a system would have been no more than 70 per cent.
After acceptance of this decision procedure by ÖPTV, ÖFEG continued by describing the competing digital systems along the criteria elaborated in advance. The suppliers participated in this process and a consensus was achieved, at least on major topics. There was a secret trial of the decision algorithm executed by the ÖPTV-group within ÖFEG. The result was very similar to the actual decision taken later by ÖPTV officials following the same algorithm. The results were passed on to the minister of transport. The two systems, which were best according to this algorithm, DMS 100 and EWSD, attained 65 per cent and 55 per cent, respectively. 11 The crucial argument for the ranking was the higher degree of maturation of DMS 100, which again shows the pragmatism of the decision makers.
The Revision of the Decision by Political Influence
This phase was rather short, taking less than a year. When ÖPTV had taken its decision, the government had to react fast if it still wanted to change it.
The decision by ÖPTV was mainly based on technological criteria. After the decision, Siemens made its presence felt, however. Both on the levels of the management and the works council intensive lobbying was executed. Siemens threatened to stop all joint-ventures in Austria. As already mentioned, the Siemens arguments fell on fertile soil and the chancellor intervened. The Austrian government and the Social Partnership prefered a co-operative solution, anyway. There was no tendency to harm Kapsch or Schrack which were genuine Austrian, though standing in a tradition of family business as opposed to socialist economic policy. The idea was rather to induce Siemens to invest in Austria. It is hard to guess what would have happened if Siemens would have been forced to take a licence from Northern Telecom. It certainly would have been a major strike against the friendly relationship between Siemens in Germany and the Republic of Austria, which spent considerable sums to attract foreign investors and owned 43,6 per cent of Siemens Österreich. Basic features of the 11 The numbers given here are based on expert remembrance and sometimes differ in value. One expert said that the respective ranking values for DMS 100 and EWSD were 75 and 65 per cent. As there exist no official numbers and none of the experts were certain about their memory, details like this could not be clarified.
Austrian economic policy were at stake. In the introduction we already indicated that the government intended to import technological know-how on a broad basis. to foster co-operation between the involved firms and to bundle technological competence in the telecom-sector. to increase employment by national production. to enhance the export opportunities of the Austrian telecom industry. from the standpoint of national security, to preserve independence in an infrastructure vital for the Austrian economy.
One interesting aspect of this list is the lack of a consistent technology policy. Historically, there exists a certain tendency in Austria to use technology policy as a synonym for export policy. Even substitution between the two policies can be observed. Export-oriented production was an explicit goal of OES-procurement. Research in the field of telecommunication was not. There was a clear commitment to strengthen the Austrian telecom industry but no commitment to endow it with technological superiority. The international technological standard was accepted as a benchmark. In this sense, the decision of the government was half-hearted. Procurement was not co-ordinated with other policy instruments like, for example, the installation of an university institute on digital telecommunication or the harmonized subsidization of private research activities. Considering the approach of National Innovation Systems, the decision can be considered as `incomplete´. It was not taken on grounds of a long-term plan on the technological development of Austria but rather as a reaction to political necessities. Especially the part of the chancellor was a reaction rather than a step in a long-term technology policy.
Development and Actual Procurement
After the choice of the two systems, DMS 100 and EWSD, actual development could begin. The process was started with the foundation of the two development organizations, AT and EZ OES-E, where the latter was later renamed AOSA. These two organizations were responsible for the development of OES along the pathway given by the specifications elaborated by ÖFEG. Before implementation of the system in 1985, all functions had to be tested by two trial facilities. Satisfaction with the performance of the trial facilities led to one last test, an experimental installation at an actual exchange, serving about 8000 lines.
The decision on where to start installation was not easy. The most urgent need was identified in some large, outdated exchanges in Vienna. The ÖFEG decided to risk an ambitious start with these large and important exchanges: In 1985, two exchanges were equipped, one with OES-D, and the second with OES-E. Each exchange served about 10.000 lines plus about 2000 trunks. The trunk function went into operation immediately, the user lines were operational by January 1996. The immediate functioning of these installations was the first success and a source of relief at the same time. According to PTA, by 1992 about 1.468.000 of 3.466.500 main lines were served by digital exchanges, that is, the portion of main lines on digital exchanges was 42 per cent. The most developed countries in 1992 were New Zealand (95 %), the Netherlands (86 %) and France (83,2 %). Austria ranged on position 19, Germany was placed 24 th (12 %).
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By now ÖFEG has elaborated about 1000 specifications and the removal of obsolete structures is as important as the specification of new ones. Austrian peculiarities concern loudness and sound quality, high reliability, and value added services. The planning horizon for the introduction of OES was 30 years. The careful planning was due to a worst-case presumption according to which a new central control would be needed every week. Today most experts expect finalization of the project by 1999. As it turned out, there were fewer technical difficulties than expected. Still more important was the unexpected quick decline of prices, which fell by about 80%. The numbers of ports purchased till 1995 are depicted in Figure 4 .
In the first years, the installation of OES seemed to follow the principle of indiscriminate distribution. The main reason is the federal constitution of Austria. All individual states demanded to be served first. There are voices saying that it would have been technologically simpler, and thus cheaper, to start with an international system in one part of Austria and to expand gradually from this spot, installing new gateways with each expansion. The decision for evolutionary growth and slow adaptation to given interfaces implied less compatibility to international standards and a late liberalization of the market of terminal equipment. One of the problems of OES seems to have been that there were too many Austrian specialities. Traditionally, all Austrian specifications were given by the provider. Only in recent years, have the firms been invited to co-operate in the elaboration of new specifications. Users are not involved in the decision process.
There are counter-arguments against criticism on the Austrian specification strategy: According to PTA-managers there is no use in debating something which has never been attainable. According to them, there existed little reserve for investment and too little production capacity in Austria. Another reason for only proceeding as quickly as necessary was to wait for further developments like, for example, ISDN. The main reason, however, was a strong political commitment to preserve all services available to the Austrian consumer before restructuring. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year Ports additional ports
Source: Interviews with PTA-Officials
According to representatives of the post, the above problems are minor and have not increased the cost of the system too much. According to PTA, construction is the main obstacle in Austria. Laying cables is quite heavily regulated and expensive. Several experts think that the renovation of the Austrian telecom network would have been quicker and certainly cheaper without this hindrance.
Costs, Prices, and Quotas
Before estimating the cost of OES and the prices paid for the system, there are some words to be said about the financial situation of ÖPTV at the beginning of the Eighties. Up to its privatization in 1996, ÖPTV was part of the ministry of transport. The basic financial decisions were not taken by ÖPTV-managers but by officials of the ministry of finance. To realize the implications of this fact, let us just consider one example: In the years preceding its privatization in 1996, the government decided to increase the debt of ÖPTV considerably. In its balance of 1995, ÖPTV declared debts of more than 120 billion ATS, about 11,2 per cent more than in 1994.
A second aspect to be considered, is the size of the Austrian switching market. Compared to international sales it is very small, only about 10 per cent of German figures. Partition of the market following from the two-systems decision even aggravated this problem. The small demand implies that ÖPTV had a weak position in negotiations with its suppliers.
As to total payments for OES up to 1995, it is very difficult to calculate correct numbers. Some of the companies have been very co-operative, whereas others consider these numbers as strategic variables and, thus, as secret. Moreover, the calculation years of the firms are different, some finishing their financial year in December, others in summer. As to ÖPTV itself, there seem to exist no official calculations. Despite their inofficial character, we still use numbers given by PTA-managers to avoid the problem of differing financial years. These numbers are of about the same magnitude as the numbers given by some firms added with estimates about the numbers of the remaining companies, where the estimates are based on the respective quotas, which are given below.
On average, the numbers of PTA tend to be smaller than the estimations based on the cooperative firms´ numbers, particularly in respect to development costs. All statements on costs and prices presented here, should be seen as estimates on the order of magnitude rather than exact calculations. According to our numbers, the installation of OES until 1995 cost 34.877 million ATS for about 3.616 million ports including OAM, supply, support, and upgrades (OAM cost about 6,4 billion ATS). This gives an average price of 9.645 ATS per port, which is a rather questionable indicator for international comparisons, though. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 The numbers include ports, OAM, supply, support, and upgrades
Source: PTA (Austrian telecom provider, former ÖPTV)
We already mentioned that ÖFEG never intervened in price negotiations. Price cutting could have hampered the free flow of information and the team spirit. Prices were settled directly between representatives of the ÖPTV and the supplying companies.
In the years from 1985 to 1989, prices were determined by annual price contests (Jahrespreiswettbewerbe) between the two teams, AT and AOSA. This procedure was adopted from German examples. In principle, the market was divided equally, that is, each team had 50 per cent. The winner of the contest, however, could win up to 4 per cent of the opponent´s market share. No matter how the shares looked like, all suppliers had to pay the lower price resulting from the contest. It is a model similar to a first-price sealed-bid auction with variable quantities. Efficient in theory, it only works if the bidders do not collude. Unfortunately, this is exactly what happened in the case of OES. Most interviewed experts agree in that the suppliers formed an informal cartel, at least in respect to their pricing strategies.
Since the first delivery up to the present, OES-E was cheaper than OES-D from AT. The main reason is that EWSD was closer to European standards and Siemens needed less man-power for development. According to experts, the lower price was due to later development and lower reliability of the system. On account of the better offer, AOSA always had a share of 54 per cent of the Austrian switching market.
Within the two teams, AT and AOSA, there existed fixed arrangements on how to divide costs and earnings. The two partners of AOSA, Siemens and ITT, decided on dividing their share in the following manner: 55 per cent for Siemens and the remaining 45 per cent for ITT. Delivering the lower bid, Kapsch and Schrack had to settle for 46 per cent of the switching market. From these payments, two thirds were cashed by Kapsch and the remaining third was left for Schrack. It is interesting to observe that Schrack participated in a much higher per centage of the costs. From the above statements, the following quotas of the respective firms, adding up to unity, can be derived: Price differences in the annual price contest were quite substancial, sometimes up to more than 25 per cent. It can be doubted, however, whether these differences were a sign of real competition. Kapsch, having developed no digital system of ist own, had won the largest share of the market for digital switches. The prices offered by Siemens were about 5-8 per cent higher than for Swiss switches and about 15 per cent higher than for their switches adapted for the German post. For ÖPTV, this seemed acceptable because of the small size of the market. Nobody doubted, however, that it was a good bargain for all Austrian suppliers. Kapsch were careful not to provoke Siemens, who were much larger and more powerful. One could say that they settled with what they got, which was no less than the conquest of the largest share of a market they had intruded just on the occasion. Being dependent on selling switches and becoming even more dependent by entering the market for digital switches, they avoided the risk of conflict.
In 1989, the AT-group intervened with the minister of transport to end the annual price contest. They argued that the contest resulted in high and unnecessary transaction costs. By then the market shares were fixed. ÖPTV agreed to open negotiations. The idea was to provoke open bidding and bargaining to reduce the adverse effect of collusion on the price. This accords with auction theory. Another strategic advantage for ÖPTV was the possibility to start negotiations with a low price offer dependent on foreign prices. ÖPTV-officials used personal and inofficial links to collegues of other European telecom providers in order to get a conception of `correct´ prices. Inflation was a strategic variable in price negotiations. Usually prices were fixed for two or three years and ÖPTV used high expectations about inflation to reduce prices. On the other hand, they never tried to minimize the price beyond macroeconomic goals like, for example, fostering national production or reduction of unemployment.
Since its privatization in 1996, PTA has no further official regard for national welfare but acts as an average profit-maximizing firm. By now, nearly all development costs are amortized and prices have approached an international level. To be more concrete, they are synchronized with Danish developments. In 1997, PTA payed about 2.400 ATS per port, including hardware (38,7%), software (47,3%), and installation (14%). For support with regard to the already existing ports, PTA pays an annual amount of approximately 125 ATS per port. Representatives of the suppliers still seem satisfied with the development of prices, which refers to OAM more than to switching, however.
Comparisons of the prices for Austrian switches to those of other countries are rather problematic. All Austrian prices were implicit until 1995: Development, support, and other price components were all included in the annual price of the switches sold. To make things more complicated, one must consider the requirements for adaptation specified by the post, which significantly increased costs. All in all, the Austrian digital system was rather expensive, owing to the weakness of ÖPTV because of the small size of the market. the system licences and the adaptation of the systems to different interfaces owing to the diversity of exchanges. Only by CCITT no.7, 17 signalling systems could be reduced to 10 (including interfaces to Romania and Bulgaria). This point makes about 50 per cent of adaptation costs. the fact that electromagnetic meters had to be `rebuilt´ in a virtual way. This accounted for about 15 per cent of the price increase in the first years, today the effect is nil. the existance of very old terminal equipment with, for that time, rather advanced functionality. This made about 35 per cent of extra costs, a per centage increased to nearly 50 per cent, owing to the requirement of absolute compatibility.
For an estimation of development costs, we again rely on numbers given by PTA. They estimate, that development cost about 1,76 billion ATS for OES-D and OES-E, respectively, plus 0,72 billion ATS owing to factors stemming from the two-systems solution. This gives 4,24 billion ATS which are regarded as extra cost resulting from the adaptation of the digital systems to Austrian requirements.
Market Power and the Number of Systems
There are different opinions on the question of whether it has been a good decision to procure two systems instead of one. The disadvantages of the chosen solution are obvious: It cost the Austrian consumer twice the development cost and nearly doubled the support and maintenance cost, not to speak of logistic problems remaining after completion of the digitalizing process. According to estimates of the Austrian telecom provider, PTA, the development of OES cost approximately 4.24 billion ATS, where about 17 per cent are due to the doubled development effort only.
According to other experts´ estimations, an additional labor force of about 200 technicians has been needed which amounts to approximately 140 million ATS per year if we take an average annual gross wage of approximately 0,7 million ATS per technician. This is to be seen as a lower boundary and reflects our caution on the matter. 13 If we calculate a time span of 17 years (from 1982 to 1999) , then this estimation would give extra costs of about 2,4 billion ATS, which is only slightly higher that the number estimated by PTA (2.12 billion ATS). Let us simply state here that the two-system solution´s extra cost was probably more than two billion ATS.
There are good arguments to qualify the above statement, however. One of the main reasons for the two-system solution is increased competition between the suppliers. By competition the telecom provider might get better quality at a lower price. Breaking the monopoly power of one supplier, a price decrease worth much more than two billion ATS seems possible. Let us discuss the plausibility of this counter-argument:
Competition in prices is difficult to quantify. Experts differ in opinion. Some say that dependence on only one system would have cost more than paying the difference for two systems. They refer to similar solutions abroad. Others think that the relation between the Austrian suppliers used to a quota system has been too close to allow for price competition. It is mostly agreed that the Austrian suppliers acted as a cartel, a fact confirmed by the negotiation representatives of ÖPTV. During price bargaining, there were cases when the suppliers´ representatives left the room together to establish a common position outside before returning to negotiations. This was not uncommon and approved of by ÖPTV.
It is more commonly accepted that the decision to implement two systems has produced significant competion in terms of quality. This refers mostly to the speed of development and to the reliability of the two systems. There was a permanent `reliability contest´, which at least in one case changed the behavior of a supplier. Towards the end of the Eighties, Siemens had not yet harmonized its international software with the national systems. Today Siemens sells the same software everywhere, with national extensions complementing the system. Before that, they had a problem of stability with their Austrian version. In 1990 ÖPTV threatened to take exchanges away from Siemens if they did not succeed in solving this problem. This threat was obviously not taken seriously enough by the parent company in Germany, which led ÖPTV to actually take an exchange away from Siemens and to commission AT with it. It was an order worth only 30 million ATS, which did not really hurt Siemens financially but led to a painful loss in reputation. According to ÖPTV-representatives, this measure improved the performance of Siemens considerably. Such a bargaining tool would have been unavailable in case of a one-system decision.
There is one more aspect that becomes obvious from the above example: The price of the hardware becomes more and more irrelevant. Updates and extensions of a digital system depend on the software. There is a potential danger for customers, buying cheap hardware, to become dependent on a supplier selling software as a monopolist free to dictate prices.
Nepotism
Questions on existence and degree of nepotism took much space in the interviews. We do not consider little `acts of friendship´ here, like, for example, the donation of a telephone set. We rather try to answer the question of whether there has been an illegal influence in the system decision itself and the distribution of quotas.
It is hard to negate that bribery has had its part in the Austrian telecom market.
14 Some experts have also hinted at certain irregularities in the context of public procurement in other cases. Yet no hint at bribery concerning the procurement of OES itself could be found. There are several reasons why this result is not too unplausible:
The Austrian system of Social Partnership with its outstanding importance of personal contacts also implies a different approach towards nepotism. Personal contacts of this kind result in individual career opportunities and increased status rather than in direct monetary compensation. This is particularly true in higher hierarchical ranks, above all, if the decision makers must act in public, as politicians have to. In the present case, decisions have been taken on the highest level possible. The foundation of ÖFEG with its transparent decision algorithm was easy to control by all competitors, thus reducing the opportunities of just one supplier to influence the decision.
It could be argued, on the other hand, that nepotism as such has been the basic principle of the system choice and the subsequent procurement procedure, though not in the form of bribery or other illegal means. There was a clear commitment to involve as many parties as possible, both on the economic and political level. The solution was a compromise following from personal contacts, governmental economic policy, and Social Partnership. This process was not only legal but commonly accepted. Social Partnership is a basic principle of the Austrian economy and, to a certain degree, determines the Austrian reality up to the present day. A public auction with respect to OES-procurement or procurement rules as used by the EU have not been discussed. This can be explained by the lack of technological know-how to some extent but is probably rather a matter of culture. Joining the EU has brought some radical changes in view-point for Austrian officials and representatives of interest. It is still an open question to what extent the Social Partnership will be able to adapt to the new framework, if this is possible at all.
Appraisal of Societal and Industrial Results
To structure the societal and industrial effects of the introduction of OES, we try to answer the following question: To what extent have the goals of ÖPTV and the Austrian government been reached? In particular: Has ÖFEG succeeded in building up know-how and human capital and has this know-how been used for innovation? Did the chosen solution strengthen co-operation between Austrian telecom experts? Has there been a significant effect on employment? Has the introduction of OES increased export opportunities? We devote one sub-chapter to each of these questions, at least trying to answer them. As to the goals of ÖPTV, the introduction of OES can be considered a success: Renewal of the network will be finished earlier than planned. The number of ports has increased enourmously and is still increasing. OES has been a basis for ISDN and value added services. Finally, ÖPTV has saved millions by reducing their requirements for room and personnel.
Effects on Know-How, Technological Dependence, and Innovation
The effects of the introduction of OES on Austrian telecom know-how have been strong and positive. Detailed knowledge on digital systems had been practically nonexistent before. By the construction of ÖFEG as a firm and stable platform gathering all Austrian resources, Austrian knowledge on digital systems has been created, allowing for genuinely Austrian developments and technological independence. Furthermore, the foundations for further developments like ISDN, broad-band ISDN, GSM, and Intelligent Networks have been laid.
The two development organizations, AT and AOSA, have also developed genuinely Austrian products. Development work by Kapsch has been acknowledged by Northern Telecom. Since 1986 the two companies have run a development joint venture employing about 60 people. A co-development contract with Hewlett-Packard failed, but not owing to technological reasons. Kapsch is also proud of having introduced some process innovations like a 24 hours emergency assistance, a concept also adopted by other companies later. In chapter 5.4 we discuss the attempt to export a version of OES-D by AT.
In the case of AOSA the situation is more difficult to discuss. Both partners, Siemens and Alcatel, are subsidiaries of foreign companies. Their development strategies are always harmonized with company goals formulated abroad. This applies particularly to Siemens, the dominant partner in this co-operation. The engineers of AOSA are willing to try their own developments but their efforts always depend on the world-wide strategies of a multinational company. All the same, product innovations for the world market have been developed, like for example those listed in Figure 6 . From what has been stated so far, it might seem that OES-procurement was an absolute success with respect to know-how and innovation. The basic structural problems in the Austrian telecom sector remained unchanged, though:
The private suppliers are too small to compete with the national champions of larger countries.
Research, if existent, is strictly private. Until the beginning of the Nineties, universities and other public or semi-public research organizations did not participate in digital telecom research. As in the time before OES, students have to spend at least two years in a private company´s R&D department to learn the basics allowing for their own research in the telecom sector. Co-operation in research between the Austrian suppliers is weak and diminishing.
ÖFEG and the two development firms, AT and AOSA, have not developed to incubator institutions. There is little mobility in staff and the three organizations have not succeeded in incubating new firms: There are no technological spin-offs.
Innovation has not allowed for significant exports. We return to this point in the next chapter.
These critical points are enforced by a patent analysis. The absolute numbers of European patents for selected countries are given in Table 5 .1.1, followed by EU-patents per population in 
: EU-Patents in Electric Communication Technics
It is obvious that the introduction of OES has been an innovation, at least for Austrian standards. The question left to discuss is whether innovation has been rather diffusion oriented or creation oriented. This question is difficult to answer because the basic systems have been licensed abroad but further developed by Austrian engineers. Again, experts differ in their opinions. Some argue that adaptation of the digital system to Austrian requirements has beeǹ creative´ and that it therefore has been a case of Development Government Procurement (DGP). On the other hand, ÖPTV has not gone its own way in digital telecommunication but simply harmonized existing systems and functionalities already existing in Austria. The systems adapted for Austrian needs were chosen according to pragmatic principles rather than to ambitious technological goals. The primary incentive was to reach international standards rather than achieving technological superiority, that is, innovation has been diffusion-oriented. Thus, the introduction of OES has been a case of Adaptive Government Procurement (AGP).
Effects on Co-operation in the Telecom Sector
As stated in the first section, one goal of procurement has been to foster collaboration between the Austrian telecom suppliers in order to strengthen them against international competition. It is difficult to judge the degree of success with respect to this goal. It cannot be doubted that the procurement strategy has forced the competitors to co-operate and even form joint development centers. The competition within ÖFEG and the need to discuss any argument with four critical parties has led to an undisputable learning effect. On the other hand, the decision to procure two systems has resulted in two separate markets. The firms have succeeded in preserving this partition of the market even in respect to the OAM-system It is not clear whether the given links will still be used after the completion of the digitalization of the Austrian telecom network.
As to the two development organizations, AT and AOSA, there are voices stating that AOSA might stagnate. The association-contract is valid until 1999. It can be doubted whether the cooperation of Siemens and Alcatel will continue after that date, be it in the given form or another way. The co-operation of Kapsch and Schrack expired in 1995, after the take-over of Schrack by Ericsson. Ericsson as a competitor of Northern Telecom retreated from the OESmarket, selling all shares to Kapsch. Thus, Kapsch is now also the only shareholder of AT.
Effects on Employment
From a Neoclassical perspective, mostly assuming a functioning labor market, the effects on employment should be nil. We do not share the assumptions of this argument, however. An analysis of Austrian labor market imperfections and a sound estimation of its effects on the Austrian telecom industry are, nevertheless, beyond the scope of this case study. We also discount the effects of OES on employment at ÖPTV. The telecom department of ÖPTV has reduced its manpower from about 18 900 to about 17 600. Yet, the loss of jobs due to rationalization is considered as inevitable and could have been worse.
To be competitive on the world market, national champions need reference projects in their home country. Without participation of all Austrian competitors the survival of at least the smaller ones was at stake. Experts have expressed different opinions regarding this point, some believing that specialization in the private telecom sector would have been a safe line of retreat, especially when there still was an excess demand and less competition. Most experts agree, however, that if, for example, Siemens had got an exclusive contract for developing OES, then survival of ITT, Kapsch, and Schrack in Austria would have been no easy matter. The least that can be said is that the indirect subvention for developing OES helped the Austrian telecom industry to follow a more aggressive export and development strategy in other sectors of the telecom market.
It is easier to estimate the qualitative effect of the introduction of OES on Austrian employment: The decision to produce in Austria has saved jobs and created new ones. A try to estimate the effect quantitatively, is rather difficult, though. It is perhaps easiest to identify the worst case: If ÖPTV would have bought all equipment abroad on a turn-key basis, then at least Kapsch, Schrack, and ITT would have faced existential problems. According to Table  3 .4.1, their closure would have implied a loss of about 5000 jobs. Exclusion of just one firm would have exposed the respective number of jobs to danger.
Due to the habit of keeping production domestic and of partitioning the market by a quota system, however, such a solution would have been rather unprobable. If ÖPTV had decided to produce in Austria but to leave all development work to the licenser, then about 400 to 500 jobs in AT, AOSA, and ÖFEG would have been at stake.
A rather difficult matter to evaluate is the threat of Siemens to stop all joint ventures in Austria in case of exclusion of EWSD. The enormous impact of the Siemens group on the Austrian economy is depicted in Table 3 .4.1. It is a matter of belief, however, whether Siemens would really have left the Austrian market completely. The same applies to estimations of the effects of such a measure.
Effects on Exports
All four companies examined here, Siemens, Alcatel, Kapsch, and Ericsson, have large export quotas in respect to their turnover, ranging from 10 to 36 per cent. This is, however, no good indicator for macro-economic effects. The effect of the introduction of OES on aggregate Austrian telecom exports can be analyzed on two levels: First, did the Austrian telecom industry succeed in developing an own digital system exportable to other countries? Second, did the participation in OES have a positive effect on exports of more general telecom equipment?
By a simple approach, the first question could be answered in the negative. Exports of an OES-version or even of an Austrian version of DMS or EWSD have been insignificant. In the case of AOSA the hopes of the former chancellor were too optimistic. Siemens intensified its activities in Austria. There were little exports of telecom equipment produced by Siemens Austria, however. On the contrary, Siemens Germany used its superior market power to compete against Austrian products on the European market.
AT has initiated several attempts to export, however. It is not clear whether the lack of success depended on procurement policy itself or rather on the political environment of potential clients abroad. In 1989, just before the political change in the former Eastern Block, AT sold 300 000 lines in Hungary and prospects looked good. There existed, moreover, a contract between AT and the Polish telecom provider. The client paid in advance for the adaptation development of a Polish digital system. In both cases, Siemens took over the market.
Two factors were decisive: The first was a complete change in management of the eastern telecom providers. Former suppliers were considered as politically inacceptable. The second factor was the early privatization of the German telecom provider and its massive support by German politicians abroad. In the case of Hungary, the liberalization of the market allowed an intrusion of the provider market. Massive political support by the German government allowed Siemens Germany as the main supplier of the German provider to take over the ATshare. In Poland Siemens simply bought AT out of the market. It might be said that the small size of Kapsch and the late privatization of ÖPTV had more effect on the Austrian export opportunities than a flawed procurement policy. It remains to be seen whether the loss of monopoly by the traditional national providers will allow for new opportunities.
As to the second question, did the introduction of OES increase exports of telecom equipment in general? Austria is a net importer of telecom equipment. Table 5 .4.1 gives the export and import shares of Austria on the world market for telecom equipment. The figures are quite disappointing. The Austrian export share is smaller than in comparable countries (eg. Belgium). From 1979 to 1989, both exports and imports have decreased. Imports have decreased less than exports, however. 764.11, 764.13, 764.15, 764.17, 764.19, 764.3, 764.81, 764.9 Source: Leo et al. (1994), p.104-107 This indicates that one of the most important goals has not been reached: The introduction of OES has not endowed Austrian firms with the ability to participate in the international telecom game. Sales of OES are restricted to PTA.
Summary and Conclusions
The procurement of OES by the Austrian post and telecom agency, ÖPTV, was a case of adaptive government procurement (AGP). It was adaptive because foreign systems were licensed and adapted to the Austrian situation, and because the goal was to reach international standards rather than technological superiority. It was classical government procurement because ÖPTV was a section of the Austrian ministry of transport.
The primary goals of ÖPTV were an increase in capacity and a reduction of costs. As an organization of the public hand, however, additional macro-economic goals were implicit in the procurement process, even though there existed no explicit strategy paper. According to these secondary goals ÖPTV insisted in home production and tried to involve all domestic suppliers. The procurement process was based on co-operation rather than on competition.
The basic problem for ÖPTV was the lack of domestic know-how on digital switching systems. By foundation of ÖFEG, where all suppliers co-operated on the development of OES, this knowledge gap was closed. There was no attempt to establish basic research, however, neither within ÖFEG nor by establishing links to universities or other research organizations. The procurement process was not accompanied by other instruments of technology policy and innovation was restricted to adaptation of foreign systems to Austrian requirements.
The driving force of the process was industry policy rather than technology policy. By the chosen solution, the Austrian government tried to save jobs in the Austrian telecom industry, to establish an Austrian platform for telecom know-how in order to achieve technological independence, and to foster exports. Somewhat simplifying the outcome, it can be argued that the government succeeded in reaching the first two goals but failed in respect to the latter one. The Austrian telecom industry has been able to perform a transition to computerized telecommunication but could not intrude international markets. On the other hand, the bare survival of a relatively small independent Austrian telecom company like Kapsch can be considered a success. Furthermore, by the industry policy of the socialist government, development joint ventures, software-houses, and semi-conductor production facilities could be attracted to Austria.
One of the main problems of the Austrian telecom industry could not be solved. Today, ÖFEG is a subsidiary of PTA. There is no independent joint research platform and Austrian companies have become licensees rather than remaining inventors. Most experts think that globalization and the international concentration of the telecom market will impose considerable difficulties on the Austrian telecom suppliers.
The rapprochement of Austria to the EU has been accompanied by fundamental economic changes. Liberalization and globalization started to influence the traditional Austrian system of `friendship´ quite some time before the actual entry into the EU. EU-regulations have added to this process. Liberalization of the Austrian telecom market started with terminal equipment. Subsequently, value added services, telephony and infrastructure were liberalized. In 1996, the Austrian telecom provider was privatized.
A process of public procurement in the telecom sector as described in the present paper, will be impossible in the future. Even if the Austrian telecom provider was still a company of the public hand, EU-regulations on public procurement would require public tenders. A cooperative process would be replaced by competition. This is good for the consumer, because it reduces prices and because technological change has a stronger orientation towards demand. For the Austrian telecom industry in general and the domestic suppliers in particular, the new policy implies existential problems.
It remains to be seen whether Austrian firms will be able to find enough market niches to survive. Competing with large national champions of other countries will impose heavy pressure on domestic producers of telecom equipment. European integration implies that Austrian firms will lose their protection. Probably the Austrian telecom firms are too small to compete on international markets if they do not find potent partners. In the case of subsidiaries like Siemens Österreich, Alcatel Austria, and Ericsson Austria, such international cooperations are already existent per definition. Perhaps the present case study helps to illuminate the advantages and disadvantages of such international economic linkages with respect to technological change.
